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Abstract
While the H1N1 pandemic is reaching high levels of influenza activity in the Northern Hemisphere, the
attention focuses on the ability of national health systems to respond to the expected massive influx of
additional patients. Given the limited capacity of health care providers and hospitals and the limited
supplies of antibiotics, it is important to predict the potential demand on critical care to assist planning
for the management of resources and plan for additional stockpiling. We develop a disease model that
considers the development of influenza-associated complications and incorporate it into a global
epidemic model to assess the expected surge in critical care demands due to viral and bacterial
pneumonia. Based on the most recent estimates of complication rates, we predict the expected peak
number of intensive care unit beds and the stockpile of antibiotic courses needed for the current
pandemic wave. The effects of dynamic vaccination campaigns, and of variations of the relative
proportion of bacterial co-infection in complications and different length of staying in the intensive care
unit are explored.
Introduction
Official national reports from several countries in the Northern Hemisphere signal increasing influenza
activity, as measured by the rise in the number of cases and patients requiring medical attention 
. From the pandemic wave in the Southern Hemisphere  and the current activity , a
clearer picture of the severity of the disease has emerged in different geographic zones. Hospitalizations
and number of cases requiring admission to intensive care unit (ICU) have been recorded, generating a
picture of disease progression and illness severity requiring medical attention, hospitalization or critical
care . This data is also crucial for clinically assessing influenza-associated complications
to update patient management recommendations .
Given the limited availability of critical care facilities and medical resources, it is important to assess the
expected potential burden on health services in order to face possible emergencies requiring highly
specialized personnel and care units, for usually long and costly stays . While a lot of work has been
conducted on stockpiling and planning for deployment and distribution of antiviral drugs in case of an
emerging influenza pandemic , much less attention has been
devoted to the role of bacterial pneumonia in pandemic planning, particularly in terms of stockpiling
antimicrobial drugs . Antibiotics are generally available through short supply chains able to
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fulfill average just-in-time requests. The pandemic wave is however expected to lead to a large increase
in the usage pattern of antibiotics possibly relevant in the management of stockpiles not only during the
peak phase but also during the decreasing trend of the epidemic activity. Based on the available
knowledge of the severity of the disease and its associated complications, we present a computational
study that explicitly considers the development of complications in order to estimate the predicted
request of ICU resources and antibiotics needed to treat complications in several countries of the
Northern Hemisphere, during the current Fall 2009 pandemic wave.
Methods
Baseline model
We use the global epidemic and mobility structured metapopulation model (GLEaM)  to
provide pandemic scenarios and quantify the expected demand for critical care resources. The model is
based on a meta-population approach  in which the
world is divided into geographical regions defining a subpopulation network where connections among
subpopulations represent the individual fluxes due to the transportation and mobility infrastructure.
GLEaM integrates three different data layers : (i) the population layer that integrates census
areas for a total of 3362 subpopulations in 220 countries of the world; (ii) the human mobility layer that
integrates both commuting flows collected from various sources in more than 30 countries and the
airline traffic provided by IATA and OAG ; (iii) the disease dynamics layer.
The model simulates short range mobility between subpopulations with a time scale separation
approach that defines the effective force of infections in connected subpopulations .
The airline  mobility from one subpopulation to another is modeled by an individual based stochastic
procedure in which the number of passengers of each compartment traveling from a subpopulation j to
a subpopulation l is an integer random variable defined by the actual data from the airline
transportation database . The infection dynamics takes place within each subpopulation. We adopt a
SEIR-like model  in which we include vaccinated individuals and specific compartments for
influenza associated complications. We also consider separate compartments for symptomatic traveling
and not traveling, as well as asymptomatic individuals in each subpopulation. All transitions are
modeled through binomial and multinomial processes to ensure the discrete and stochastic nature of the
processes . Asymptomatic individuals are considered as a fraction  of the  
infectious individuals generated in the model and assumed to infect with a relative infectiousness of    
. Change in traveling behavior after the onset of symptoms is modeled with the probability  
 set to 50% that individuals would stop travelling when ill  (see Figure 1 for a detailed
description of the compartmentalization). Initial conditions are defined by setting the start of the
epidemic in La Gloria in Mexico on 18 February 2009 . In the model we use values of
generation time interval and transmissibility according to the estimates of . In particular, we
use the reproductive number R =1.75 with the generation interval set to 3.6 days (average latency
period of 1.1 days and an average infectious period of 2.5 days). Those values are obtained by using the
model to perform maximum likelihood analysis of the parameters against the actual chronology of
newly infected countries as detailed in Ref. . The method is computationally intensive as it involves
a Monte Carlo generation of the distribution of arrival time of the infection in each country based on the
analysis of 1 Million worldwide simulations of the pandemic evolution with the GLEaM model. It is
important to remark that the best estimate of the reproductive number refers to the reference value that
has to be rescaled by the seasonality scaling function. Seasonality is considered in the model by means
of a sinusoidal forcing of the reproductive number, with a scaling factor ranging from α  during
Summer season to α  during Winter season . Here we consider α = 1.1 and α  in the range
0.6 to 0.7, that is the best estimate obtained from the correlation analysis on the chronology of 93
countries seeded before June 18 in Ref. . This seasonal scaling provides an effective reproductive
number in the Northern hemisphere in the range 1.2 to 1.6 in the spring/fall months, in agreement with
published estimates of the reproductive number. The best estimates of the model parameters provide
predictions for the influenza activity peak in countries in the Northern Hemisphere in
October/November in the baseline scenario , consistent with the influenza activity now being
observed in surveillance reports . In the following we will use the reference value α =0.6. A
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full discussion of the model’s limitations and of the sensitivity analysis of the model’s assumptions is
reported in Ref. .
Vaccination
We model the administration of vaccines through a dynamic vaccination campaign with a uniform
daily rate r of distribution to the population in countries where doses are available, till their exhaustion.
We explore two values for the daily distributions rate, r =0.1% consistent with the current availability of
doses and distribution in several countries, and r =1% based on the distribution policies planned during
Summer 2009 on the timing of vaccine development and testing . We assume the administration of
a single dose of vaccine, providing protection with a delay of 2 weeks. A full description of the
vaccination implementation and sensitivity analysis is reported in Ref. .
Influenza-associated complications
Following the most recent estimates of the severity of H1N1 pandemic, we assume a complication rate
of 15% of clinical cases , a hospitalization rate of 0.5% of clinical cases , and an ICU admission rate
of 15% of hospitalized patients . We model influenza-related pneumonia as a complication associated
to influenza infection, considering two main types of pneumonia – primary viral pneumonia and
secondary bacterial pneumonia. While bacterial coinfection was shown to be the predominant cause of
death in previous influenza pandemics , its presence in the severe cases analyzed since the start of
the outbreak range from almost no evidence in the early reviews , to about 10% , 33% or
larger proportions  of the cases presenting influenza-associated complications. These
fluctuations in the role of bacterial pneumonia might be due to the difficulty of testing for specific
bacterial diagnosis, or to the use of antibiotics prior to routine clinical tests. Given the uncertainty on the
cause of pneumonia at this stage of the epidemic evolution, we assume a proportion of bacterial
pneumonia in cases showing complications in the range of α= 33-50%, with a sensitivity exploring a
10% proportion. Under pandemic conditions, it is assumed that very small differences will be
implemented in the management and treatment of the patients with either types of pneumonia, as the
diagnosis of influenza-associated complications will be mostly based on clinical findings and most
prescribing will be empirical, based on both antibacterial therapy and antiviral medications .
Multiple subsequent stages of pneumonia course are modeled according to the CURB-65 classification
score  as reported in Table 1, and different progressions are assumed to take into account both viral
and bacterial pneumonia (see Figure 1). It is also worth remarking that the model does not consider
social structure in the subpopulations, therefore the effect of prioritized distribution of  vaccines to
individuals belonging to  risk groups in reducing the number of hospitalizations and deaths is not
considered in the present study. These assumptions represent a necessary trade-off for the
computational efficiency of the model that allows to perform parameter estimations fitting the
worldwide pattern of the pandemic , explore several scenarios under different conditions, and
perform sensitivity analysis on the assumptions. Once the disease parameters and initial conditions are
defined, GLEaM generates in-silico epidemics for which we can gather information such as incidence
and prevalence of all stages considered in the compartmentalization, for each subpopulation in the
world and with a time resolution of one day. All results shown in the following sections are obtained
from the statistics based on at least 2,000 stochastic runs of the model.
Results and Discussion
Based on the available knowledge of complication, hospitalization and ICU rates, and the relative
proportion of bacterial vs. viral pneumonia, the simulation results allow the measure of the predicted
need of beds in intensive care units, and provide estimates of the corresponding courses of antibiotics
needed. Figure 2 shows the time evolution of the predicted prevalence of ICU occupancy for a given set
of countries. In the baseline case, when no intervention is implemented, the ICU prevalence peak
ranges between approximately 5 and 7 ICU beds per 100,000 people. These values are well below the
national average capacity of some countries, such as e.g. the United States with a total of about 20 ICU
beds per 100,000  and Germany with an average of approximately 28 ICU beds per 100,000 .
The predicted need is slightly lowered if a 0.1% dynamic vaccination is considered, and would be
reduced to values in the range of 3.6 to 4.8 ICU beds per 100,000 if we assume r =1%, below the
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national average number of ICU beds of many European countries . While the predicted ICU beds
needs are averaged at the country level to conform with the capacity data, it is however important to
note that the impact and the potential occurrence of critical situations strongly depends on the
geographic distribution of the critical care resources, with areas that might have access to a larger
number of intensive care units than others (see for example Ref. ). Moreover, a direct comparison
between the simulated demand and critical care availability is made difficult by the lack of a standard
definition for intensive care unit beds, and the large variations observed in both numbers of beds and
volume of admission between countries in North America and Western Europe .
The results shown in Figure 2 are based on an average ICU length of staying equal to L =7 days.
Since there is a large variation in this parameter, with cohort studies showing median duration of 7 days
and interquartile range up to approximately 2 weeks , we also explored the effect of considering
longer lengths of staying, L =10 and L =14 days. The longer bed occupancy would inevitably lead
to an increase in the need of ICU beds at peak, in the range of approximately 9 to 12 per 100,000
persons in the case of 14 days of average ICU duration (see Table 2).
Table 3 reports the number of antibiotics courses needed daily at the peak of the requests, and the total
size predicted to be used at the end of the pandemic wave, based on the empirical guidelines of the
British Thoracic Society  and broken down by the stage of severity of pneumonia. A single
course of antibiotics is defined as the combination of antimicrobial drugs considered in the treatment
regimen for the suggested duration (see Table 1). In the case of non severe pneumonia, the predicted
need for antibiotics at peak usage is in the range of [150-230] courses per 100,000 with variations
depending on the country under study, under the assumption that no intervention is considered. The
total size of antibiotics courses predicted to be used in the current Fall 2009 pandemic is in the range of
[6,337-7,149] per 100,000, which needs to be compared with the available stockpiles of antibiotics
courses to cover high-risk groups. Many countries however do not possess nation-wide antibiotic
supplies, and the estimates contained in Table 3 can therefore be considered as guidelines to assess the
expected needs during the remaining evolution of the pandemic wave with respect to the present usage
pattern and available resources.
Along with anecdotal reports indicating ICUs being overwhelmed by the sudden surge of H1N1 cases
with severe complications , studies on the Winter experience in the Southern Hemisphere during the
H1N1 pandemic wave confirm a substantial impact on ICUs, with the maximum number of ICU beds
occupied by region in Australia and New Zealand ranging between 0.63 and 1.1 per 100,000 inhabitants
. These values are smaller than the ICU demands predicted for the Fall wave in the Northern
Hemisphere. It is important to note, however, that the used model does not take into account the
population structure (age dependent attack rates), risk groups and prior immunity thus likely
overestimating the global attack rate of the pandemic. Furthermore we do not include in the model
mitigation factors (e.g. social distancing, targeted school closures, etc.) that might have contributed to
the reduction of the overall burden on the critical care facilities in the Southern Hemisphere; a similar
reduction on burden could also be seen in the Northern Hemisphere.
Accurate descriptions of expected scenarios are important to define and quantify the expected increase
in the needs for healthcare infrastructure and medical resources. With the uncertainties on the
evolution of the current pandemic wave decreasing, these estimates can be used to better plan for
potential additional resources that might be needed in a short time, both at the peak time and after the
peak activity has been reached. A full comparison and understanding of similarities and differences of
the Winter pandemic waves in the two Hemispheres will then be crucial for understanding the impact
of H1N1 pandemic on the population and on the health care infrastructure in different settings.
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Figures
Tables
Table 1: Severity assessment, recommended action, and estimated durations assumed in
the model. We refer to CURB-65 score as the method used to determine the management of
influenza-related complications in patients admitted to hospital . CURB-65 score is calculated by
assigning one point for each of the following: Confusion (mental test score of ≤8, or new disorientation
in person, place or time),Urea >7 mmol/l, Respiratory rate ≥30/min, Blood pressure (SBP<90 mmHg
or DBP≤60 mmHg), Age ≥65 years. Three subsequent stages are defined to model complications, based
on the recommended action. Patients with bilateral lung infiltrates on chest radiography consistent with
viral pneumonia are assumed to be managed as severe pneumonia, regardless of CURB-65 score .
The preferred empirical antibiotic regimens for treatment of patients in each stage are based on the
guidelines issued by the British Thoracic Society . Patients in home treatment and hospital ward
are assumed to take co-amoxiclav 625mg tds PO or doxycycline 200mg stat and 100mg od PO for 7
days, and patients in ICU are assumed to take co-amoxiclav 1.2g tds IV or cefuroxime 1.5g tds IV or
cefotaxime 1g tds IV plus Macrolide (erythromycin 500mg qds IV or clarithromycin 500mg bd IV) for
10 days. All patients at all stages of severity of complications are also expected to receive antivirals, with
a dosage of 2 tablets per day.
Table 2: Predicted need of ICU beds in the baseline case scenario and in the case of
vaccination campaigns. The 95% reference range (RR) of the daily number of occupied ICU beds per
100,000 is reported at its peak for several countries in the Northern Hemisphere. 
Table 3: Predicted usage pattern of antibiotics in the baseline case scenario and in the case
of vaccination campaigns. The 95% RR of the daily number of administered antibiotics courses per
100,000 at its peak is reported, along with the total amount predicted to be administered by the end of
the pandemic wave. Results are shown for several countries in the Northern Hemisphere, broken down
for different stages of influenza-associated complications. Pneumonia stages I, II and III corresponds
to home-treatment (or supervised outpatient treatment), hospital wards and ICU, respectively (see
Figure 1 and Table 1).
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Diagram flow of the transmission model. A susceptible individual interacting with an
infectious person may contract the illness and enter the latent compartment where he is infected but not
yet infectious. At the end of the latency period, each latent individual becomes infectious entering the
symptomatic compartment with probability (1-p ) or becoming asymptomatic with probability p .
Asymptomatic individuals infect with a reduced transmission rate. A fraction (1-p ) of the symptomatic
individuals would stop traveling when ill. A full description of the parameter values is reported in Ref.
. If vaccines are available, a fraction equal to r  of the susceptible population enters the susceptible
vaccinated compartment each day. A similar progression to the baseline compartmentalization is
considered if infection occurs (see Ref. ). The model assumes that infectious individuals might
a a
t
[29]
v
[46]
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develop complications with a rapid progression to severe conditions requiring hospitalization or ICU
admission (i.e. second and third stage of the complications tree, respectively), or home treatment (i.e.
first stage) with pneumonia symptoms appearing during the early convalescent period of the influenza
infection . The compartments 'hospital ward 1' and 'hospital ward 2' refer to different lengths of
staying of the patient in the hospital ward (see Table 1), depending on subsequent worsening of
symptoms or direct recovery, respectively. Progressions from one stage to the others is modeled
according to the average length of staying in each compartment as obtained from clinical studies 
 (see also Table 1) and based on the available estimates of complication, hospitalization and ICU
admission rates .
Figure 2: Time evolution of the ICU occupancy in a set of countries. ICU occupancy measures
the predicted need of ICU beds per 100,000 persons. Results for the United States, France, Germany,
and Spain are shown. The three profiles per each country refer to the predicted ICU occupancy in the
baseline case when no intervention is implemented, and in case dynamic vaccination campaigns with
distribution rates r =0.1% and r =1% are considered. Solid curves correspond to the median profiles and
the shaded areas to the 95% reference range obtained from 2,000 stochastic simulations. The average
ICU length of staying is assumed equal to 7 days .
Severity  of
com plications
Assessm ent Recom m ended
action /
com partm entalization 
Average duration
non-severe   
pneumonia
CURB-65=0-2 home treatment or 
superv ised outpatient
treatment                      
3.5 day s 
severe
pneumonia
CURB-65=3
or presence of
bilateral lung
infiltrates on chest x
ray
hospital ward 1.5 day s to ICU admission 
(hospital ward 1), 5 day s to
recovery  (hospital ward 2)
[49]
[13],
[15]
[3],[6],[7 ]
v v
[15]
[9]
[13]
[13],[15]
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CURB-65=4-5
or bilateral chest x
ray
changes
ICU
7 , 10, 14 day s 
ICU occupancy  at peak (per 100,000)
Country Baseline Vaccination cam paigns
  0.1% 1%
 7  day s 10 day s 14 day s 7  day s 10 day s 14 day s 7  day s 10 day s 14 day s
US [5.0-5.6] [6.8-7 .5] [8.7 -9.7 ] [5.0-5.5] [6.7 -
7 .3]
[8.6-9.4] [4.5-4.6] [5.9-6.2] [7 .6-7 .9]
UK [5.7 -6.5] [7 .6-8.6] [9.9-11 .0] [5.5-6.2] [7 .4-8.2] [9.6-10.5] [3.9-4.6] [5.2-6.1] [6.7 -7 .7 ]
Canada [5.0-
5.7 ]
[6.7 -
7 .6]
[8.7 -9.9] [4.8-5.5] [6.5-7 .3] [8.5-9.5] [3.8-4.4] [5.1-5.8] [6.5-7 .3]
France [5.9-6.6] [7 .9-
8.7 ]
[10.2-11 .2] [5.7 -6.2] [7 .6-8.3] [9.8-10.6] [3.6-4.4] [4.9-5.9] [6.3-7 .4]
Italy [6.5-7 .1] [8.6-9.4] [11 .0-
12.0]
[6.2-6.7 ] [8.2-8.9] [10.5-
11 .3]
[3.6-4.5] [4.8-5.9] [6.1-7 .4]
Spain [5.8-6.4] [7 .8-8.6] [10.0-
11 .0]
[5.6-6.1] [7 .5-8.2] [9.6-10.5] [3.8-4.5] [5.1-5.9] [6.5-7 .5]
Germany [6.6-7 .3] [8.8-9.7 ] [11 .2-12.2] [6.4-
7 .0]
[8.5-9.2] [10.8-
11 .6]
[4.0-
4.8]
[5.4-6.4] [6.8-8.0]
Antibiotic usage – baseline
Country Daily  adm inistered AB courses at
peak  (per 100,000)
T otal adm inistered AB courses at the
end of pandem ic wave (per 100,000)
 Pneum onia
stage I
Pneum onia
stage II
Pneum onia
stage III
Pneum onia
stage I
Pneum onia
stage II
Pneum onia
stage III
US [152-17 1] [4.4-4.9] [0.8-0.9] [6,196-6,455] [183-191] [31 .7 -33.0]
UK [17 6-197 ] [5.1-5.8] [0.9-1 .1] [6,529-6,845] [193-203] [33.3-35.1]
Canada [150-17 0] [4.4-5.0] [0.8-1 .0] [6,508-6,7 55] [192-200] [33.0-34.8]
France [184-201] [5.3-5.9] [1 .0-1 .1] [6,611-6,906] [195-204] [33.7 -35.4]
Italy [202-221] [5.8-6.4] [1 .1-1 .2] [6,7 58-6,981] [200-206] [34.4-35.8]
Spain [17 8-195] [5.2-5.7 ] [0.9-1 .1] [6,584-6,815] [194-202] [33.4-35.1]
Germany [208-230] [5.9-6.6] [1 .1-1 .2] [6,7 39-6,990] [199-207 ] [34.4-35.8]
Antibiotic usage – vaccination with r =0.1%
Country Daily  adm inistered AB courses at
peak  (per 100,000)
T otal adm inistered AB courses at the
end of pandem ic wave (per 100,000)
 Pneum onia
stage I
Pneum onia
stage II
Pneum onia
stage III
Pneum onia
stage I
Pneum onia
stage II
Pneum onia
stage III
US [151-166] [4.4-4.8] [0.8-0.9] [6,005-6,220] [17 7 -184] [30.7 -31.9]
UK [17 0-186] [4.9-5.4] [0.9-1 .0] [6,297 -6,540] [186-193] [32.1-33.6]
Canada [147 -164] [4.3-4.9] [0.8-0.9] [6,27 8-6,457 ] [185-191] [31 .8-33.3]
France [17 6-188] [5.1-5.5] [0.9-1 .0] [6,357 -6,585] [188-195] [32.3-33.8]
Italy [191-206] [5.5-6.0] [1 .0-1 .1] [6,481-6,633] [191-196] [32.9-34.1]
Spain [17 1-185] [5.0-5.4] [0.9-1 .0] [6,335-6,511] [187 -193] [32.1-33.6]
Germany [200-216] [5.7 -6.2] [1 .0-1 .2] [6,47 6-6,654] [191-197 ] [33.0-34.2]
Antibiotic usage – vaccination with r =1%
Country Daily  adm inistered AB courses at T otal adm inistered AB courses at the
[13],[15]
v
v
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peak  (per 100,000) end of pandem ic (per 100,000)
 Pneum onia
stages I
Pneum onia
stage II
Pneum onia
stage III
Pneum onia
stages I
Pneum onia
stage II
Pneum onia
stage III
US [140-144] [4.0-4.1] [0.7 -0.8] [4,801-4,862] [142-144] [24.5-25.0]
UK [120-140] [3.5-4.1] [0.6-0.8] [4,452-4,7 62] [131-141] [22.7 -24.5]
Canada [121-133] [3.5-3.9] [0.6-0.8] [4,517 -4,7 32] [133-140] [22.9-24.4]
France [110-136] [3.2-4.0] [0.6-0.7 ] [4,390-4,682] [130-139] [22.4-24.0]
Italy [110-136] [3.2-4.0] [0.6-0.7 ] [4,230-4,539] [125-134] [21.5-23.3]
Spain [116-137 ] [3.4-4.0] [0.6-0.8] [4,429-4,652] [131-137 ] [22.5-24.0]
Germany [126-150] [3.6-4.3] [0.7 -0.8] [4,311-4,655] [127 -138] [22.0-23.9]
Articles from PLoS Currents are provided here courtesy of Public Library of Science
View publication stats
